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CHECKS-PRESENTMENT.--In Hannon v. Allegheny Bellevue Land Co.,
44 Pa. Superior Ct. 266 (19io) a check was given in settlement of a transaction at 1.30 o'clock in the afternoon, but was not presented for payment
until the third day afterwards, and one day after the bank on which it
was drawn failed. All the parties interested in the check as well as the
bank on which it was drawn, were located in the same city. The court held,
that under Sec. 186 of the Negotiable Instruments Act which says that "a
check must be presented for payment within reasonable time after its
issue," the delay in this case was unreasonable, and a check must be presented for payment before the close of banking hours on the day after
its delivery, or the drawer will be discharged from his liability thereon
to the extent of the loss caused by the delay. This decision seems to be
in accord with all the authorities on the subject. "Reasonable time" urder
the act must be taken in the light of decisions of the courts which have
previously stated what constitutes reasonable time for the presentation of a
check. Gordon v. Levine, 194 Mass. 418 (i9o7); Matlock v. Scheuerman,
93 Pac. 823 (9o8).
In Rickford, et al., v. Ridge, 2 Campbell, 537 (18io), Lord Ellenborough
held it "to be convenient and reasonable that checks received in the course
of one day should be presented the next." This rule has been universally
adopted in cases where all the parties to the check and the bank on which
it was drawn are located in the same city or town. Bank v. Weil, 141 Pa.
457 (1891) ; Loux & Son v. Fox, et al., 171 Pa. 68 (1895) ; Willis v. Finley,
173 Pa. 28 (1896); Industrial Trust, Title and Saving Co. v. Weakley, 1O3
Ala. 458 (1893); Simpson v. Pac. Ins. 44 Cal. 139 (1872); Bickford v.
First National Bank of Chicago, 42 Ill., 238 (1866); Northwestern Coal
Co. v. Bowman, 69 Iowa iso (1886); Grange v. Reigh, 93 Wis. 552 (1896);
Gregg v. Bean, 69 Vt., 22 (1895); Kirkpatrick v. Puryear, 93 Tenn. 409
(1893); Parker v. Reddick, 65 Miss. 242 (1887); Carroll v. Sweet, 128
N. Y. 19 (i891); 2 Daniel Neg. Inst.. 5th Ed., p. 159o and cases cited;
Byles Bills (Wood's Ed.) 212; Story Prom. Notes, p. 493; Bigelow Bills
and Notes 78; Cent. Dig. Vol. VII, Bills & Notes, p. io95.
CONTRACTS FOR PROFESSORSrnPs-TERMINATION.-Plaintiff entered into
a contract with a medical school, whereby in consideration of a chair in the
faculty, he executed to the school five promissory notes payable at intervals
of a year. Held, that the contract was not terminable at will, but contemplated a permanent professorship, subject to be determined for cause.
Hospital College v. Davidson, 131 S. W. Rep. 1004 (Ky. igo).
In the law of England, college and university professors are regarded
as public officers, removable only for cause. Philips v. Bury, i Ld. Ray.
5 (1694); King v. Bishop of Ely, 2 T. R. 290 (1788). This view is also
taken in an early Massachusetts case. Murdock's Appeal, 24 Mass. 303
(1828). But it has since been held that not even in a State university, is a
professor a public officer. Butler v. The Regents of the University, 32
Wis. i24 (1873).
His relation to the institution which employs him is,
therefore, necessarily contractual.
Where the contract between the college and the professor is silent as
to its duration, there is no settled rule of law which governs its construction.
In ordinary contracts of employment, the rule varies. In Co. Lit., 42 b, it
is said that if a man retain a servant generally, without expressing any
time, the law shall construe it to be for one year. See also Hobbs v. Davis,

(34s)
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Other courts hold that a contract for personal services,
which does not purport to be binding for a definite period, is terminable at
the will of either party. Irish v. Dean, 39 Wis. 562 (1876); Davis v. Barr,
The most equitable rule seems to be that the question
12 N. Y. 1ii (1887).
of the duration of the contract is to be governed by the circumstances of
each particular case. Smith v. Theobald, 86 Ky. 142 (1887). So it has even
been held that where a statute authorized the removal of a professor whenever
the interests of the college required, such provision became a condition of
his employment for a definite time. Ward v. Board of Regents, 138 Fed.
372 (1905).
Governed by the rule that the peculiar circumstances of the case must
determine the duration of the contract, the court, in the recent Kentucky
case, decided that the large amount of the compensation paid for the seat
in the faculty and the fact that the notes were to extend over a period of
five years, indicated that the intention of the parties must have been to contract for a permanent professorship.
30 Ga. 423 (i86o).

CONTRACTS OF MARRIED WOMEN-MORAL OBLIGATION AS CONSIDERATION.-

Prior to the passage of an act authorizing married women to contract
as if unmarried, the plaintiff, a grocer, furnished supplies to the defendant,
a married woman. After the enactment of the, enabling statute, she expressly promised to pay for the supplies. Held: No liability attached to
such a promise since it was supported by no legal consideration. Lyell v.
Walbach, 77 Atl. Rep. iiii (Md. igio).
As to whether the moral obligation of a woman to pay for benefits
received during coverture is sufficient consideration to give validity to a new
promise made after the disability is removed, the doctrine of this case is in
accord with the great weight of authority, numerically considered, at least.
Since no liability can attach to the contract of a woman under coverture,
such void contract can not be consideration for a new promise after discoverture. Eastwood v. Kenyon, ii Ad. & El. 438 (i84O), overruling the doctrine
of Lee v. Muggeridge, 5 Taunt, 36 (1813); Gilbert v. Brown, 29 Ky. 1248
(19o6); Warner v. Warner, 235 Ill. 448 (19o8).
If, however, the original promise or debt, though unenforceable at
law, is binding in equity, upon the separate estate of the wife, a promise to
perform the obligation, made after discoverture, is valid. Bibbs v. Davis,
2 Hayw. & H. 364 (Fed. 1861); Condon v. Barr, 49 N. J. L. 53 (1886);
Sherwin v. Saunders, 59 Vt. 499 (1887).
The leading case upholding the validity of the new promise, even
though the original obligation is not binding at law or in equity, is Goulding
v. Davidson, 26 N. Y. 604 (1864). It is followed in Brownson v. Weeks,
47 La. An. Io42 (i895); Leonard v. Duffin, 94 Pa. 218 (i88o). This case
excepts from the rule, cases where the original debt was entirely that of
the husband. This distinction is recognized in Stockton Bros. v. Reed, 65
The
Mo. App. 604 (1896), and Nesbit v. Turner, 155 Pa. 429 (1893).
latter case is qualified by Rathfon v. Locher, 215 Pa. 571 (9o6), in which
the original promise was made by the wife as surety for the husband's debt
and its renewal after discoverture was held valid.
CRIMES-TAMPERING

WITH

PUBLIc

REcoDs.-Under

Sections

113

and

114, of the Penal Code of California providing for the punishment of any

one who is guilty of stealing, wilfully destroying, mutilating, defacing,
altering or falsifying any record, map or book or any paper or proceeding
of any court, a ledger containing accounts of receipts and disbursements of
bail money was held to be a public record within the meaning of the statute.
People v. Tomalty, III Pac. Rep. 513 (Cal. i9IO).
A public record has been well defined in Coleman v. Conn., 25 Gratt.
The court says: "Whenever a written record of the
(Va.) 865 (1874).
transactions of a public officer in his office, is a convenient and appropriate
way of discharging the duties of his office, it is not only his right but his
duty to keep that memorial, whether expressly required to do so or not; and
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when kept it becomes a public document, a public record belonging to the
office, and not the officer; is the property of the State and not the citizen
and is in no sense a private memorandum." In this case a warrant book
of the sinking fund of the State was decided to be such a record.
Among the writings which Mr. Greenleaf classes as public writings and
evidence per se, are "books kept by persons in public office in which they
are required, whether by statute or by the nature of their office, to write
down transactions occurring in the course of their public duties and under
their personal observation." I Greenleaf Ev., 16th Ed., §483.
Under acts punishing the altering of a public record or document as
forgery, the following have been held within the act: A writ of fieri facias
issued from the office of the prothonotary of the courts of common pleas,
Com. v. Cullin, 13 Phila. 442 (Pa. 1879) ; a list of returns made by a deputy
surveyor, Ream v. Com., 3 Sar. & Rawle 207 (Pa. 1817); the record of a deed
though the deed was invalid, People v. O'Brien, 96 Cal. 171 (1892); a verified
copy of a ship's manifest containing a list of alien immigrant passengers,
delivered to the United States inspection officers, M'Inerney v. U. S., 143
Fed. 729 (i96); statistical information gathered by the commissioner of
labor statistics under an act, People v. Peck, 138 U. G. 386 (i893).
The following were not classed as public records a memorandum book
kept by a judge of probate for his own convenience and not required by
law, Downing v. Brown, 3 Colo. 571 (1877); a deposition to be used as
evidence in an action, Atkinson v. Reding, 5 Blackf. (Ind.) 39 (1838); a
jail warrant drawn by the clerk of the board of supervisors on the county
treasurer, Harrington v. State, 54 Miss. 490 (1877); a tax duplicate, Smith
v. State, I8 Ohio 42o (r868); a form of entry signed by a judge and intended for entry in the journal of the court, Whalley v. Tongue, 29 Or.

48 (j896).
OF MENTAL SUFFERING INCIDENT TO PERSONAL
Is ALLOWABLE.-Where a plaintiff had a
good cause of action for personal injuries due to the negligence of defendant's servants, it was held, that mental worry, distress, grief and mortification
are proper elements of mental suffering for which a jury may award damages. Merrill v. Los Angeles Gas and Electric Co., III Pac. Rep. 534
(Cal. igio).
There are cases which hold that mental suffering as a distinct element of
damage in addition to bodily pain, is not a subject for compensation. Joch
Johnson v. Wells Fargo, 6 Nev. 224
v. Dankwardt, 85 Ill. 331 (877);
But in most jurisdictions recovery is allowed for physical pain
(i87o).
and mental suffering. Sedgwick on Damages, 8th Ed., §44, and authorities
cited. And it has long been settled that an injury which operates primarily on
the mind or nervous system may be considered by the jury in assessing
damages. Watson on Personal Injuries, §390; Ballou v. Farnum, ii Allen 73
(Mass. 1865); Railway v. Boddeley, 54 Ill. i9 (1870).
Mental suffering may, however, spring from very different sources.
It may exist as a mere incident of physical pain; it may be due to shame,
humiliation, annoyance, vexation, sorrow, grief, sentimental distress, fright
or nervous apprehension; or it may be a consequence of disfigurement of
the person. In many jurisdictions, damages are awarded only for such
suffering as is incident to physical pain. Linn v. Duquesne Boro., 204 Pa.
551 (I9O3); So. Pac. Co. v. Hetzer, 135 Fed. 272 (i9o5); Railroad v.
Mental distress springing from the other
Chance, 57 Kas. 40 (I896).
causes mentioned, is held intangible, incapable of test or trial, sentimental,
too remote, too speculative, to constitute an element of actionable injury.
Other courts refuse to take this attitude and allow recovery for almost
any form of mental suffering brought on by bodily injury. Gray v. Washington Power Co., 30 Wash. 665 (1903); Heddle v. R. R., 77 Wis. 228
(I8go); R. R. v. Young, .8i Ga. 397 (r888); Power v. Harlow, 57 Mich.
ri (I885); R. R. v. Clark, 21 Tex. App. 167 (i899). Still other courts
allow damages for mental suffering not incident to bodily pain only where
DAMAGES-ELEMENTS

INJURIES

FOR WHICH

RECOVERY
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the personal injury was actuated by malice. Railway v. Hines, 45 Ill. App.
To make this dis299 (i8gi); Randolph v. R. R., 18 Mo. App. 6o9 (1885).
tinction is to regard damages of this kind as exemplary or punitive, in the
face of the fact that the courts are almost unanimous in holding that they
are of a compensatory character. Watson on Personal Injuries, §391.
In Merrill v. Los Angeles, etc. Co., the California Supreme Court,
deciding the question de novo, reaches the conclusion that unless grief,
anxiety, worry, mortification and humiliation suffered by reason of physical
injuries, are elements of the mental suffering for which damages may be
awarded, "mental suffering" is a meaningless term; that physical pain is
but one of many forms of mental suffering; that if the mental suffering
must be that occasioned by physical pain, the lqtter phrase alone, would
be sufficient to convey the full meaning of the law; and that mental suffering by reason of shame, humiliation or wrong is no more speculative,
remote or intangible, than physical pain, or mental suffering arising from
physical pain.
DAMAGES-MENTAL SHOCK INDUCED BY PHYSICAL INJuRY.-In an action
to recover for personal injuries, damages for mental shock were allowed
under the following circumstances: Defendant discharged a blast which
threw a rock into plaintiff's house. There was no evidence that she was
hit by the rock, but she testified that a door hit her and she was thrown
to the floor. There were no bruises on her body and her physician testified
that she suffered simply from neurasthenia as a result of the shock. The
court allowed the jury to find that the woman had either been struck in
some way due to the blast, or had been violently thrown to the floor, and
that her condition was therefore not entirely due to fright or distress of
mind. Driscoll v. Gaffey, 92 N. E. Rep. ioio (Mass. i9io).
It is a rule in many jurisdictions that damages for fright, anguish,
remorse or any other abnormal mental condition, unaccompanied by an
injury to the person, cannot be estimated, and are too remote to warrant a
recovery. Pollock on Torts, 3d Ed., 54, and cases cited. However, the
courts in which this rule prevails are so impressed with its injustice that
they seize upon any pretext to allow a recovery-even the most frivolous
legal wrong, and however slight the immediate harm may be. Goode, J.,
Hickey v. Welch, 91 Mo. App. 4 (Igoi). The recent Massachusetts case is
a typical instance of this tendency of the courts. Other cases in which
compensation has been permitted for mental pain although the physical
injury was so slight as to be negligible, are: Hess v. Pipe Company, 221
Pa. 67 (19o8); Railroad v. McGinnis, 46 Kas. iog (1891); Warren v. The
Railroad, 163 Mass. 484 (1895); City Transfer Co. v. Robinson, 12 Ky. Law
Rep. 555 (i8gi); Buchanan v. R. R., 52 N. J. L. 265 (189o); Berard v.
R. R., 177 Mass. 179 (igoo).

DivoRcE-Co.LUsioNIn a suit for divorce the evidence showed an
agreement between the parties that the wife should proceed to procure a
divorce, the husband furnishing her with the money. Held, that such agreement is collusive, and the petition for divorce must be dismissed. Sheehan
v. Sheehan, 77 Atl. Rep. 1O63 (N. J. 19ro).
The general rule is, that however just a cause may be, if the parties
collude in its management so that in reality both are plaintiffs, while by
the record the one appears as plaintiff and the other as defendant, it cannot
go forward. Gentry v. Gentry, 67 Mo. App. 55o (1896). To the same
effect are Latshaw v. Latshaw, 18 Pa.' Super. Ct. 465 (19Ol) where the wife
agreed with the husband that she would make no defense; and Thompson v.
Thompson, 70 Mich. 62 (1888), where the wife agreed to make no claims
for allowances or alimony in order to expedite and make more certain
the decree.
But it is not collusion where the defendant, being also desirous of a
divorce, of his own volition appears in court and makes no defense. Pohlman v. Pohlman, 6o N. J. Eq. 28 (1goo); Erwin v. Erwin, 40 S. W. 53
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(Tex. 1897); nor where a wife, having good grounds for divorce, in order
to prevent unnecessary publicity and scandal makes an agreement with her
husband as to the amount of alimony. Ham v. Ham, 18i Mass. 17o (1902);
Snow v. Gould, 74 Me. 54 (1883).
EVIDENCE-CRIMINAL TaiALs-PREsuMPrioN OF INNOCENCE AS EVIDENCE
AccUSED.-Upon a trial for murder, where the plea was self defense,
the court instructed the jury in substance, that the presumption of innocence
remains with the prisoner until the killing is proved or admitted by the
defendant; it then devolves upon him to show any circumstances of mitigation to excuse or justify the homicide, by some proof strong enough to create
in the minds of the jury a reasonable doubt of his guilt of the offence
charged. Held, the instruction was not erroneous. Culpepper v. State,
xix Pac. 679 (Okla. 19io).
The contention of the defendant, that this presumption is evidence in
favor of the accused, and that it remains with him throughout the whole
trial under any and all circumstances, squarely raises the question: "Is the
presumption of innocence evidence, having probative force, to be put into the
scale and weighed along with the other evidence in the case?" This doctrine has the support of the Supreme Court of the United States in Coffin v.
U. S., 156 U. S. 433 (1895). But the opinion in that case has been severely
criticised: I Elliott on Evid. §92, 4 Wigmore on Evid. §2511; and Professor
Thayer has dearly demonstrated that the authorities cited in the opinion
give very little support to the doctrine. Prel. Treatise on Evid. 55I. This
opinion received apparent sanction in Allen v. U. S., 164 U. S. 492 (896);
but in Agnew v. U. S., I65 U. S. 36 (897) its particularly objectionable
sentence declaring that "this presumption is to be treated as evidence" is
referred to as "having a tendency to mislead." And in U. S. v. Wilson,
176 Fed. 8o6 (igio) the presumption is treated as in the principal case.
Though followed in some jurisdictions, People v. Milner, 122 Cal. 171 (1898);
St. v. Clark, 75 Atl. s34 (Vt. i9io), the weight of authority is certainly
against Coffin v. United States, Strickland v. St., i51 Ala. 31 (19o); St. v.
Fahey, 54 AtL 69o (Del. x9o2); Stevens v. Comm., 20 Ky. L R. 48 (1898);
People v. Ostrander, 1io Mich. 6o (1896). And it was expressly repudiated in
St. v. Linhoff, 121 Iowa 632 (1903); St. v. Maupin, 196 Mo. 164 (I9O6).
What appears to be true may be stated thus: the presumption of innocence,
like any other presumption, relieves the party in whose favor it operates from
going forward in argument or evidence. But it is not evidence; and involves
no rule as to the weight of evidence necessary to overcome or destroy it.
FOR

EVIDENCE-PRIVILEGED CoMMuNICATIoNs-WHEN NOT BETwEEN PHYSICIAN
AND PATENT.-In the case of People v. Austin,, 93 N. E. 57 (N. Y. 191o).

the defendant, being indicted for murder, pleaded insanity and at the request
of counsel a physician was appointed by the court to examine his mental
condition. The examination was made but the physician was not called as
a witness for the defense. He was however called in rebuttal by the district
attorney. The objection that this testimony was privileged was sustained by
the court. This ruling was reversed by the court of appeals, though of course
it could not reverse the conviction, beneficial to the prisoner.
At common law communications to physicians were not privileged,
Greenleaf's Ev. §248. In New York a statute provides "No person duly
authorized to practice physic or surgery shall be allowed to disclose any
information which he may have acquired in attending any patient in a professional character, and which information was necessary to enable him to
prescribe for such patient as a physician or to do any act for him as a
surgeon." Code Civ. Prac. §834. Similar statutes have been passed in many
of the other States: Cal. Codd Civ. Proc. §i88i; Ind. Rev. St. 1881 §497;
Iowa Code §46o8; Mo. Rev. St. 899, §4659; Mich. Comp. laws, 847, §io,i8i;
Utah Rev. St. §w3414.
There is a strong tendency in two cases to restrict the operations of
the rule. This is due, probably, to the attempts of the courts to avoid unjust
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decisions, for there are many occasions when the case of one side depends
wholly upon the testimony sought to be excluded. Thus the courts have
held that the burden is upon the party seeking to exclude the evidence by
showing that it is within the statute. People v. Schuyler, io6 N. Y. 298 (z887).
The information must be acquired to enable the physician to prescribe for
his patient. Carrigan v. North, 39 Mich. 6o6 (1878).
In California by
statute the rule is limited to civil action. People v. Lane, 30 Pac. i6 (1894).
While the exact facts of the present case have not often come before
the courts, the few decisions are all in accord. Nesbit v. People, i9 Col.
441 (1894), and People v. Glover, 38 N. W. 874 (Mich. 1888) both present
exactly the same facts and decisions as the case under discussion. It seems
that this exception to the general rule is well taken and that the voluntary
subjection of the prisoner while in jail to medical examination should not
become the subject of privilege. This case seems to differ greatly from the
ordinary case of physician and patient where often the very reason for
employing a medical man is the trust that may be placed in his discretion.
In such a case as the present the examination is not secured for the sole
benefit of the accused. It is agreed to by the prosecution for the express
purpose of enabling a physician to testify as to the prisoner's mental condition. It would seem impossible and unjust to allow the prisoner, with
the consent of the prosecution, the privilege of introducing the testimony
if the result should be favorable to him and yet reserving to himself the
power of excluding the testimony if it should proe unfavorable.
EVIDENCE-CONFESSION-VOLUNTARY-BURDEN
OF PRO F.-In Berry v.
State, iii Pac. 676 (Nov. 22, I91O, Okl.), objection was made to the admission
of a confession of the prisoner because it was not voluntary but 'was
extorted by fear of punishment and prompted by hope of leniency. Held:
Prima facie any confession is admissable in evidence, and where its admissability is challenged by the defendant, the burden is on him to show that
it was procured by such means or under such circumstances as to render it
involuntary.
The weight of authority seems to be that the prosecution has the burden
of proving the voluntary character of the confession before it is admissable.
Regina v. Thompson, i895 L. R. 2 Q. B. 12; Hopt v. Utah, I1O U. S. 574
(1883); Thompson v. Commonwealth, 2o Gratt. 724 (1870); State v.
Smith, 72 Miss. 420 (1894); Campbell v. State, I5o Ala. 70 (907); Watts
v. State, 99 Md. 30 (1904); State v. Johnson, 30 La. Ann. 881 (1878);
People v. Soto, 49 Cal. 67 (874);
State v. Moorman, 27 S. C. 22 (1887);
Smith v. State, 74 Ark. 397 (I9O5); Mitchell v. State, 79 Ga. 73o (1887);
State v. Hernia, 68 N. J. L. 299 (1902).
The more recent view, that adopted by our principal case, is favorably
commented upon by text writers: i Wigmore Evidence, §86o; Elliott Evidence, §274, and seems to be well recognized, although still in the minority.
See the cases cited as authority in the opinion and the following: Williams
v. State, ig Tex. App. 276 (i885); Thurman v. State, i69 Ind. 240 (19o7) ;
State v. Armstrong, 203 Mo. 554 (19o7); State v. Sanders, 84 N. C. 728
(i88i); Dixon v. State, i3 Fla. 636 (i87o); People v. White, 121 N. Y.

449 (189o).

The Pennsylvania rule is seen in Epps v. Commonwealth, 193 Pa. 512
(1899). Upon the introduction of evidence of confession by the State, the
prisoner is allowed the privilege of cross-examination but may not offer
rebutting testimony until the issue is before the jury, who are to decide as
to the value of the evidence. If subsequent testimony has shown the confession to have been involuntary, the court may instruct the jury to disregard it.
The reason for the majority rule seems to be in the principle that every
possible advantage must be indulged in favor of the prisoner. The minority
rule is certainly more logical, as shown by the text writers. The latter is receiving more general recognition.
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NUISANCE-ERECTION OF HOSPITAL FOR CONTAGIOUS DISEASES IN RESIDENCE
SECTION OF A

COTY.-It has been recently decided in Washington that the

maintenance of a tuberculosis hospital in the residential section of a city,

where its location depreciates the value of contiguous property from 33
to 5o per cent., and causes such continued apprehension in the minds of the
occupants of such property as to prevent their comfortable enjoyment
thereof, constitutes a nuisance, although such hospital is carried on with due
regard to the welfare of the inmates and the public, is a great benefit to
the community, and could not be carried on so well elsewhere, because of
the inconvenience to attending physicians. Everett, et ux., v. Paschall, iri
Pac. Rep. 879 (Wash. i9io).

The lower court found that "there exists a general public dread of
tuberculosis, and the maintenance of a tubercular hospital in the vicinity of
residences detracts from the comfortable use of such residential property,
on account of the dread of contagion therefrom in the minds of persons
ignorant of the true nature of the disease and the harmlessness of such
sanitaria"; that "the fear or dread of the disease is, in the light of scientific
investigation, unfounded, imaginary and fanciful"; that plaintiffs' property
had been lessened in value from 33 to 5o per cent., because of being contiguous to that on which the hospital was located; but that, nevertheless,
the injury, if any, which the plaintiff's would suffer from the continuance
of the hospital would be dainum absque injuria, and that, therefore, no
injunction should be granted. As already indicated, this decision was reversed
on appeal, the main ground for reversal being that the lower court erred in
deciding that the fear which prevented the comfortable enjoyment of
plaintiffs' property was unreasonable. The opinion states that when the fear
is shared by the whole community to such an extent that property values
are diminished, it is not for the court to say that such fear is unfounded or
unreasonable, especially where there is danger of contagion, if there should be
any carelessness on the part of the nurses of the hospital. The interesting
point in the case is the fact that the decision is based on the prevention of
the comforfable enjoyment of their property by the plaintiffs, through the
fear of contracting the disease, although it was not probable that such would
be the case. There are not many cases which rest their decision on this
element, as there is always the additional one of lessening the value of contiguous property; but the case of Stotler v. Rochelle, et al., log Pac. Rep.
788 (Kan. I9IO) seems to do so. In that case the hospital was for the treatment of persons afflicted with cancer, and was to be located in the residence
section of the city, and the court affirmed the judgment of the lower court
in granting a permanent injunction to restrain the erection of such a hospital, the bill being brought by one who owned property adjoining that on
which it was proposed to build the hospital. There seems to be no reason
why the interference with the comfortable enjoyment of one's property
should not take the form of fear as well as annoyance by offensive odors,
or otherwise, where no actual harm is done to plaintiff's health; and when
such interference with the comfortable enjoyment of property is coupled
with a material diminution in its value, and the thing complained of is not
in what might be called its proper locality, it is submitted that it is entirely
reasonable for a court to find that a nuisance exists and to grant an injunction
restraining the same. "The question is one of reasonableness or unreasonableness in the use of property, and this is largely dependent upon the locality
and its surroundings." Wood, The Law of Nuisances, 3d Ed. Vol. I, §9.
PARTNERSHIP-LIABILITY OF REPRESENTATIVE OF DECEASED PARTNER.In an
action against the executor of the estate of a deceased partner for a partnership debt, it was held, that the Partnership Act of 1897 did not alter the
common law rule as to the joint liability of partners. Seligman v. Fried-

lander, 92 N. E. Rep. 1047 (N. Y. 19io).

At common law the sole right 'of action of the joint creditors of a partnership was against the survivors, and they originally had no claim in
equity against the estate of the deceased partner unless the survivors were
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insolvent, or some other reason of an equitable nature existed. Lane v.
Williams, 2 Vern. 292 (Eng. 693). New York, Pennsylvania, and some
other jurisdictions adopted this rule. Voorhis v. Child's Exr. 17 N. Y. 354
(1898); Lang v. Kepple, I Binney 123 (Pa. I8o4); Caldwell v. Stileman,
I Rawle 212 (Pa. 1829).
Subsequently, however, the English courts decided that in equity all partnership debts are joint and several; and that, consequently, joint creditors
have a right, in the first instance, to proceed at law against the survivors,
or to proceed against the estate of the deceased partner. Devaynes v.
Noble (Sleech's Case) I Mer. 54o (18 6). 'However, New York and
some other jurisdictions adhered to the early common law doctrine. Leggatt
v. Leggatt, 79 N. Y. App. 141 (1903).
But the weight of authority is
now in favor of the modern English rule. Nelson v. Hill, 46 U. S. 127
(1847). Doggett v. Hill, io8 Ill. 560 (1884). And a large number of States,
notably Pennsylvania, have by statute adopted this view. Pa. Act of Apr. ii,
1848 P. L. 536. Brewster's Admx. v. Sterrett, 32 Pa. 15 (1858).
ToRTs-ActiONS FOR MALICIOUS

PROCUREMENT

OF AN

INJUNcTioN.-In

Kryszke v. Kamin, 128 N. W. i9o (Mich. i9IO), the defendant by the wrongful and malicious procurement of an injunction without reasonable cause,
prevented a certain sale of the plaintiff's goods. In an action for malicious
prosecution, recovery was allowed.
The decision is consistent with the general law and is sustained by the
cases cited in the opinion and the following authorities: Newark Coal Co. v.
Upson, 4o Ohio St. 17 (1883); Burt v. Smith, 84 N. Y. App. 47 (i9o3);
Meyers v. Block, i2o U. S. 2o6, 211 (I886).
An action for the malicious prosecution of a civil suit is governed by
the same principles as one for the malicious prosecution of a criminal action.
There must be malice and want of probable cause and the malicious suit
must be terminated in favor of the plaintiff.
The right to recover for the malicious prosecution of civil suits presents an interesting historical development. Prior to the Statute of Marlbridge, 52 Hen. III, 1267, where one sued another maliciously and without
probable cause, he was liable in an action on the case but after the passage
of that statute, which gave costs to the defendant per falsum clamorem, the
action could not be maintained unless the person of the defendant were
arrested, his property attached or some special damage was done to him
such as the institution of bankruptcy proceedings or proceedings to have
the plaintiff declared insane. The English courts have rigorously followed
this rule and it is law today. Quartz Hill Consolidated Gold Mining Co. v.
Eyre, L. R. Ii Q. B. 675 (1883).
For many years the American courts followed the English. principle,
Mitchell v. S. W. R. R. 75 Ga. 398 (1885), bti comparatively recently, despite
the weight of authority and the animadversion of the text-writers, the courts
began to adopt the contrary view and it is now quite generally recognized.
Cooley Torts 3d Ed., 349 and cases there cited.' For an interesting discussion of die inapplicability of the English rule to our conditions, see
article by John D. Lawson, 21 Am. Law Reg. N. S. 281, 353 (1882). See also
I8 Cent. L. J. 242 (1884).
In some jurisdictions where the filing of an injunction bond is necessary,
it has been held, that the remedy of the plaintiff is confined to the bond.
Lawton v. Green, 5 Hun, 157 (1875), but the weight of authority seems to
establish the contrary proposition. Lawson Rights, Remedies and Practice
5791, Robinson v. Kellum, 6 Cal. 3o9 (1856); Hayden v. Keith, 32 Minn. 277
(1884); Iron Mountain Bank v. Mercantile Bank, 4 Mo. App. 505 (1877);
Crate v. Kohlsaat, 44 Ill. App. 46o (1892); G. J. L. L. & D. R. R. Co. v.
IC G. J., & E. R. R. Co., 47 W. Va. 725 (igoo).
ToRTs-LIArLITY FOR NEGLIGENCE OF INDEPENDENT CONTRACTOR IN WORK

NoT INHERENTLY DANGEROus.-In Lafferty v. United States Gypsum Co., III
Pac. 498 (Kan. IgIO), the plaintiff's husband, a laborer employed by an
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independent contractor, was killed by a rock which fell from the roof of a
mine owned by the defendant company. A judgment for the plaintiff was
reversed on the grouwd that it cannot be held as matter of law that mining
is so intrinsically or'-nherently dangerous as to make the owner of a mine
liable for the negligence of an independent contractor resulting in injuries
to a servant of such contractor.
To the general rule, that an employer is not liable for the negligence
or improper execution of work by an independent contractor, there are
many limitations; one of which is that the contractor is responsible where
the work is inherently dangerous. Bower v. Peate, L. R. I Q. B. D. 321
(1876); Hotel Co. v. Gallagher, 129 Ill. App. 557 (igo6); Wetherbee v.
Partridge, 175 Mass. I85 (igoo). Of course the danger must be inherent in
the work to be done, and not result from the collateral negligence of the
contractor. Bonapart v. Wiseman, 89 Md. 12 (1899); Cuff v. Railroad Co.,
35 N. J. L. 17 (870); Water Co. v. Ware, 83 U. S. 566 (1872). But jurisdictions differ as to the inherent danger of some operations, as blasting.
See Edmundson v. Railroad Co., iii Pa. 316 (1885); McCafferty v. Railroad
Co., 6i N. Y. 178 (1874) expressly disapproved in Wetherbee v. Partridge,
supra; Joliet v. Harwood, 86 Ill. 110 (877); Railroad Co. v. Finley, 117
S. W. 413 (Ky. i9O9). In recent cases cutting down trees in a forest, Young
v. Lumber Co., 6o S. E. 655 (N. C. i9o8); raising the roof of a brick
building, Smith v. Humphreyville, 104 S. W. 495 (Tex. 1907); sinking of a
caisson and the construction of bridge piers for a railroad, Bridge Co. v.
Ballard, ix6 S. W. 93 (Tex. igog) were held, not intrinsically dangerous.
Courts have hitherto held that mining generally is not so dangerous as to
come within the rule, where it was not shown that the mine was unsafe
when the contract was made, or that the owner reserved control of its
operation. Shaw v. Oil Co., 9 Scottish L. R. 254 (1872); Martin v. Gold
Mining Co., i7 N. S. Wales L. R. 364 (1896); Smith v. Belshaw, 89 Cal.
427 (I89I); Iron Co. v. Erickson, 39 Mich. 492 (878);
Samuelson v.
Mining Co., 49 Mich. 164 (1882); Kelley v. Howell, 41 Ohio St. 438 (1884);
Welsh v. Pl.rrish, 148 Pa. 599 (1892). It would seem the 'principal case
would have been differently decided in Ohio and possibly Massachusetts.
Jacobs v. Fuller Co., 67 Ohio St. 70 (19o2); Mulchey v. ,Religious Society,
125 Mass. 487 (1878).
TORTs-LIABILITY OF CONTRACTOR TO A THIRD PERSON FOR DmcTmva
CONsTRucnoN.-Well settled principles govern the decision in Thornton v.
Dow, iii Pac. 899 (Wash. i9IO). Upon the facts the case is extreme; it
appearing that one detail of the building of an armory was the erection of
a balcony in the drill hall. This balcony had a railing built according to
specifications and accepted by the State upon completion of the whole building.
While an athletic meet was in progress the spectators crowded to the edge of
the balcony. The railing gave way and precipitated the plaintiff, among
others, to the floor below. The plaintiff, alleging negligence, sued the contractors for personal injuries. Held: He could not recover.
The principle governing this class of cases is that in the sale of an article
not in its nature dangerous there is no general or public duty but only a duty
arising out of the contract which does not extend to strangers thereto. This
rule is of a very general application. The differing results attained from
it, depend upon varying interpretations of facts. One of the first, and perhaps the leading decision on this point is Winterbottom v. Wright, io M. & W.
1o9 (i855), a case that has been many times cited with approval in both
countries. From the host of American authorities, Albany v. Cunliff, 2 N. Y.
i65 (1849), and Marvin Safe Co. v. Ward, 46 N. J. L. ig (1884), are especially
applicable, on their facts, to the present case. A full list of authorities may
be found in the note to Smith v. 1st Presby. Church, 26 L. R. A. 504 (Pa.
1894) and in the opinion of Jaggard, J., in O'Brien v. Am. Bridge Co., 11o
Minn. 364 (igio).
There are several reasons advanced by the various cases in support of
the above-mentioned rule. One often cited is that of legal policy-there would
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be no bounds to actions and litigious intricacies if the ill effects of the
negligence could be followed down the chain of results to the final effect.
Another is that of business policy-if the contractor who constructs a boiler,
steam-engine or bridge owes a duty to the whole world that his work shall
contain no hidden defect it is difficult to measure his responsibility and
no prudent man would engage in such occupation upon such conditions, Curtin
v. Somerset, 14o Pa. 70 (i89i). Nor does it seem proper to hold the contractor for a situation which although he may have been the cause of it, is
beyond his power to rectify. The person injured was not on the premises
by the contractor's invitation or consent nor could the latter remedy the
defective article or control any arrangement of details which might have
prevented the accident.
In the case under discussion it will be noted that in no possible way could
the plaintiff escape the consequences of the rule mentioned and recover. The
contractors were found to have carried into effect without change two specifications furnished, under the personal supervision of the architect in charge.
The actual breaking of the rail was caused by the unusually violent rush of the
crowd to the edge of the balcony. Either of these facts would be sufficient
to remove all shadow of doubt .as to the proper application of the above
rule to this case.
WASTE-MORTGAGEE'S

RIGHT

To

BRING SUIT FOR WASTE.-A

mortgagor

in possession of the mortgaged premises leased them for use as a pest house.
A junior mortgagee brought an action of tort in the nature of waste against
the lessee. Held, that he could recover an amount equal to the diminution
in market value of the premises caused by such use. Delano v. Smith, 92
N. E. Rep. 5oo (Mass. 191o).

The courts in Massachusetts and some other States consider the mortgagee
as having the legal title and therefore award him full damages for injury
done to his estate by acts of waste by the mortgagor. Prudential Ins. Co. v.
Guild, 64 Atl. Rep. 694 (N. J. I9o6) ; or by a person who acts under the
mortgagor, Webber v. Ramsey, ioo Mich. 58 (1894); Atkinson v. Hewit, 63
Wis. 396 (1885). A junior mortgagee has the same rights as a first mortgagee, Gooding v. Shea, IO3 Mass. 36 (i869), especially if the first mortgagee
waives his right of action, Sanders v. Reed, z2 N. H. 558 (1842).
Where by statute or otherwise, the mortgagee has a mere lien, he cannot
have an action on the case in the nature of waste because his interest is contingent and may be defeated by payment of the debt secured by the mortgage.
Peterson v. Clark, 15 Johns. 2o5 (N. Y. 1818); Vanderslice v. Knapp, 20
Kan. 647 (1878). He has, however, an action for acts of waste which
impair his security and he may recover the damage done to his mortgage as
distinguished from injury to the land itself. Lumber Co. v. Busse, 86 N. Y.
Supp. io98 (1904); Smith v. Frio Co., 50 S. W. (Tex. 1899). After foreclosure, or entry for condition broken, the mortgagee may everywhere recover
full damages for all injury done subsequently. Ocean A. & G. Corp. v. Ilford
Gas Co., 2 K.'B. 493 (1905).

As a general rule equity, disregarding the person in whom the legal
estate may be considered as vesting, will not interfere to restrain acts of waste
on the part of the mortgagor unless it is alleged and proved that the acts
complained of are such as may render the security of doubtful sufficiency for
satisfaction of the debt. King v. Smith, 2 Hare 239 (Eng. 1843) ; Martin's
Appeal, 9 Atd. Rep. 490 (Pa. 1887); Williams v. Chicago Exhibition Co.,
i88 Ill. ip (igoo).

